Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Andrei Gomberg
Author-X-Name-First: Andrei
Author-X-Name-Last: Gomberg
Author-Email: 
Author-Workplace-Name: Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)
Author-Name: Cesar Martinelli
Author-X-Name-First: Cesar
Author-X-Name-Last: Martinelli
Author-Email: martinel@itam.mx
Author-Workplace-Name: Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)
Author-Name: Ricard Torres
Author-X-Name-First: Ricard
Author-X-Name-Last: Torres
Author-Email: 
Author-Workplace-Name: Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), Universitat de Girona
Title: Anonymity in Large Societies
Abstract: In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur "equal size" coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, provided the measure space is sufficiently rich in coalitions of the same measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characterization of preference aggregation rules.
Length: 24 pages
Creation-Date: 2002-09
Revision-Date: 2002-11
File-URL: http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/martinelli/02-11.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2002
Number: 0211
Classification-JEL: D71, C69
Keywords: 
Handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:0211