On the Effects of Regulation-Induced Forex Market Segmentation in Small Open Economies

Alejandro Reynoso
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

October 2002
Discussion Paper 02-04
On the Effects of Regulation-Induced Forex Market Segmentation in Small Open Economies

A Simulation Model based on the Stylized Facts of the Mexican Experience

Alejandro Reynoso *

October, 2002 †

Abstract

The central banks of small open economies have to procure the proper operation of the payments system for transactions with the rest of the world. They do so facing the constraint of a limited stock of international reserves. To make ends meet, they usually rely on three instruments: the choice of an exchange rate regime, the regulation of the foreign exchange transactions of commercial banks and general exchange controls. Based on some stylized facts of the Mexican experience of the past three decades, this paper uses a Simulink® model to show the effects of different institutional constructs on some key nominal variables. For a reasonable set of simulation parameters, it shows that either the complete segmentation of the peso-dollar market or a full integration of both markets are preferable to intermediate arrangements that contemplate some form of partial financial liberalization.

---

*Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
†First draft. Comments welcome
Introduction

The problem

The central banks of small economies have virtually an unlimited capacity to help their own government and local banks to satisfy their short term liquidity needs in the local currency. Unfortunately, those central banks would have to rely on their stock of international reserves to extend credit in a foreign currency to distressed banking institutions or to fund the government in case of their failing to roll over debt.

From this perspective, the international reserves are not only needed to defend a fixed or administered exchange rate, but also to respond to more general shortages in foreign funding. Hence, the impact of domestic and external shocks on the exchange rate, interest rates and country risk spreads will depend on what the reserves are ultimately committed for.

To make ends meet, the authorities usually rely on three instruments: the choice of an exchange rate regime, the regulation of the foreign exchange transactions of commercial banks and general exchange controls.

It is certainly not unusual that under a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank would try to shield its reserves from shocks specific to banks or certain sectors in the economy, by introducing some sort of exchange controls. However, even when the exchange rate is allowed to float freely, central banks may need to hold significant levels of international reserves to be able to keep the payments system going in times of distress.

The Mexican Experience of the last three decades offers a good “one stop” example of the kind of constructs of exchange rate regimes and formulas to segment the foreign exchange market that can be seen in practice.\(^1\)

In the 1970’s, the authorities had in place a package that combined a fixed exchange rate regime \(^2\) with virtually no restrictions to any form of foreign exchange transactions. When the crisis of 1982 arose, the central bank found itself without reserves to face the needs of the current account, the government and the banks. Hence, Mexico devalued, defaulted on foreign lenders and on domestic deposits denominated in dollars.

The policy response was to fix the exchange rate after the first round of

\(^1\)For a more detailed account of what happened over these period on the foreign exchange market front, see Aspe [2], Blanco and Garber [3], and Ortiz [16]

\(^2\)For the purposes of this paper, a crawling peg will be thought be equivalent to a fixed exchange rate regime.
devaluations, and to impose widespread exchange controls. The transactions in the capital account were reduced only to direct foreign investment and loans granted by international financial institutions.

In the early 1990’s, as part of an economy-wide strategy of deregulation and privatization, the exchange controls on firms and the public were lifted. Banks were allowed to borrow and lend in foreign exchange, but were not allowed to take deposits from the public other than in pesos. In addition, banks were required to match their overall holdings of assets and liabilities in foreign exchange. During this time, the peso floated within a rather narrow band.

The crisis of 1994 required to use a large proportion of the reserves to defend, for some time, the exchange rate; and later to lend the banks who were unable to roll over their short term obligations. The central bank opened for almost a year a dollar discount window. Banks drew close to US$4.0 billion during the first six months, out of an estimated US$10 billion in interbank loans that were due in that same period.

The response to this new crisis was to let the peso float and to further limit the foreign exchange transactions that banks could make. In fact, banks were not only required to balance their dollar books, but to match their assets and liabilities in foreign exchange by maturity dates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Banks can lend in US$</th>
<th>Banks can borrow in US$ from foreign creditors</th>
<th>Public can hold US$ deposits in local banks</th>
<th>Generalized Capital controls</th>
<th>Exchange Rate Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-76</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-82</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Crawling Peg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-91</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Crawling Peg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-94</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Target zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Floating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Institutional Arrangements in Mexico’s Forex market

Six years into the operation of this package of rules, the debate on where to move forward appears to be considering two main alternatives: on the one hand, to further loosen the restrictions on banks by asking them to show a long dollar position, or in other words, to require banks to have a part of their capital denominated in dollars and earmarked to a balance sheet in
dollars. The other initiative is far more aggressive. It consists on allowing the operation of branches of foreign banks in the Mexican territory. They would also be given the authorization to take deposits and make loans in any currency.

The authorities may soon decide on the course of action to follow. In doing so they will be conditioned by at least the following four facts:

1. Since the collapse of the banking system in the aftermath of the 1994-95 crisis, most institutions have changed hands in favor of foreign owners. Aside from the fourth largest bank, the rest of the institutions of any significant size are subsidiaries of American, Canadian or Spanish banks.

2. Foreign banks operate as subsidiaries, which means that their liabilities are limited to the capital of the company incorporated in Mexico and that is the holder of the banking license.

3. A recent change in the Banking Law gives the Ministry of Finance the power to discretionarily authorize the operation of branches, whose liabilities would be limited to the capital of the parent (holding) company. However, the Executive branch has yet to exercise powers.

4. Mexico’s Currency Law assigns a legal tender status only to the peso. Hence, a full integration of Mexico’s payments system to that of the other country (i.e. equal status to both currencies) would require an amendment of such law.

Before proceeding, it shall be pointed out that the characteristics of the financial sector that underlies our discussion are rather similar across most of the Spanish speaking Latin American countries. In the specific case of Mexico, the commercial banks are only national banks, in the sense that are subject exclusively to Federal regulations. They are a dozen in number, and about $\frac{3}{2}$ of the industry is concentrated in the top 4 institutions. The Central Bank is autonomous and retains the power to regulate all banking transactions involving any foreign currency. However, the prudential regulation dealing with accounting practices and capital sufficiency is in the hands of the Ministry of Finance.
The literature

The relevance of the research in the area of capital controls comes from the fact that, contrary to what happened in the past, they take more subtle forms today. Notwithstanding, we believe that their impact may still be substantial.

The recent research on this topic may be limited by the fact that, in practice, the implementation of these sort of capital controls has a lot to do with the way in which banks and other financial intermediaries are regulated in their every day operations. To the extent that such rules tend to be complex and rather obscure, their presence and implications are less obvious to the eyes of the analysts. This happens in spite of the fact that aside from the Mexican case, there are some other similar and interesting examples of forex market segmentation in countries such as Argentina, Chile, South Korea and Colombia, documented by and Abrams and Beato [1].

In this paper, we suggest that the so called first and second generation models of exchange rate collapses could offer a good technical framework for answering policy questions dealing when deciding on how to regulate the forex market.

On the one hand, the early models by Salant and Henderson [18], Krugman [11] and Flood and Garber [9] capture in a simple mathematical formulation the fact that individual agents take into account their own projections on how the stock of reserves will evolve when deciding whether or not hold the local currency at the existing price. The second generation models, like the ones surveyed in Flood and Marion [10], add three elements that will be useful in understanding the defensive policy responses like the ones that we have described for the Mexican case;

- First, authorities generally pose non-linear policy responses to attacks. Although the literature focuses on fiscal and monetary reaction functions, like in Calvo [5] and Obstfeld [15], it does not rule out the non-linear regulatory caps like the ones typically present in the practice of banking regulation.

- Second, it is not unusual to find multiple equilibria solutions, due to information costs like in Morris and Slim [12], or to policy responses as suggested by Obstfeld [14]. In our case, we will find the possibility of multiple equilibria coming from the stochastic specification of the model, not very differently from the one suggested in Obstfeld [15].
• Finally, agents are not necessarily homogeneous which raises a variety of issues on how they assimilate each other’s beliefs and actions, like in Calvo [4]. In our case, the general public, the commercial banks and the international financial markets represent agents who face constraints that are different for reasons ranging from their own preferences to the institutional environment where they operate.

This paper also build upon some of the notions presented by Chinn and Dooley [7], Gultekin et.al. [13] and Dornbusch and Reynoso [8] in the context of the financial repression literature. These papers stress the fact that it is not always true that taking steps in the direction of financial liberalization is the best course of action. In fact, a selective and discretionary liberalization of some segments of the market could end up increasing the vulnerability of this sector to real and nominal shocks.

This paper

The specific scope of this paper to show some simulation results from a model that tries captures on the one hand, the implications of not using international reserves exclusively for defending a peg; and on the other hand, the effects of various restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, like the ones used by Mexico, on some key nominal variables such as interest rates, country risk spreads and the exchange rate.

To that end, the first section explains the specification of the model. Section two parameterizes the model with values that may be reasonably found in a small open economy. Section three ranks the results in terms of some stabilization policy criteria.

Finally, the simulations are run on MATLAB-Simulink® in order to allow the reader to carry out her own simulations, if she decides to do so, on a widely used open platform. All the relevant code is included in the paper. In addition, a MATLAB GUI is available from the author on request.

1 The Model

The setting has two currencies. The local currency will be generically referred as pesos, and the foreign currency will be the dollar. The exchange rate will be expressed in terms of dollars per peso. All variables will be nom-
inal. The general price level at home and abroad will be assumed constant and set equal to one.

To simplify things we will consider a Krugman-Flood-Garber economy with the following exchange rate determination equation:

\[ e = \min \left( \frac{R}{W}, e_{\text{target}} \right) \]  

(1)

where \( W \) stands for nominal wealth of the public, denominated in pesos; \( R \) is some definition of the stock of international reserves and is denominated in dollars; and \( e_{\text{target}} \) is the target exchange rate set arbitrarily by the authorities.

1.1 The agents

The model has four agents with the following constraints and behavioral characteristics:

Central Bank. We will work with a simplified balance sheet of the central bank. On the asset side, we will see the net loans in pesos, \( L_p \), plus the loans in dollars \( L_d/e \) to commercial banks. To this amount we will add the international reserves \( R/e \). It will be assumed that that there is a reserve requirement imposed on commercial banks equivalent to 100% of the peso deposits and that individuals hold pesos only in the form of deposits. In this economy there is no currency in circulation and therefore, \( B \) in equation (2) stands for the monetary base.

\[ L_p + L_d/e + R/e \equiv B \]  

(2)

We will assume that at any given time there is an exogenously determined supply of dollars available to the central bank, the commercial banks and the public. Such supply is governed by a stationary process in equation (3) which can be also seen as some sort of balance of payments equation,

\[ R^s = m + sz \]  

(3)

with \( z_j \sim \text{N}(0,1) \), for all \( j \), and \( \text{cov}(z_i, z_j) = 0 \) for \( i \neq j \). The small \( s \) is the standard deviation of the process (3), and the subscripts \((i, j)\) can be thought as indices for independent observations.

The supply \( R^s \) is distributed across agents according to equation (4),
\[ R^* = R + D_d + L_d \]  

(4)

where \( D_d \) are the dollars in the hands of the public. Implicit in this definition is the notion that all current account surpluses are transferred somehow first to the central bank, either by interventions in the forex market or by some fiscal channel \(^3\). The redistribution back to the private sector happens through direct interventions to defend the parity, via the accommodation of the demand \( D_p \), or by the dollar loans made to distressed banks, \( L_d \).

Figure 1: SIMULINK representation of the central bank subsystem

Figure 1 is the SIMULINK representation of equations (1) to (4). It only adds to what we have already said the remark that the central bank will also passively attend to the needs of the commercial banks in pesos.

Commercial Banks. In the most general model, we will assume that banks carry two books. One in dollars and another one in pesos. To keep

\(^3\)This type of specification, where reserves fluctuate without an explicit intervention of the central bank in the foreign exchange market is not that far away from reality in the case of Mexico. There the central bank holds the foreign exchange accounts of the Federal Government. For instance, the national oil company, PEMEX has to surrender all its export revenues to the central bank; simultaneously the federal government is credited with those proceeds in its peso account with Banco de Mexico.
things simple, equation (5) implies that, with respect to their operations in pesos, the local banks only play the role of taking deposits and placing them in their respective accounts at the central bank. $K_p$ is the capital in the peso book, denominated in pesos. $D_p$ are the deposits that the public has in pesos, and $-L_p^c$ are the deposits that banks have in their peso accounts in the central bank.

\[ K_p + D_p = -L_p \quad \text{ (5)} \]
\[ K_d + L_d^f - P_d - A_d = -L_d \quad \text{ (6)} \]

Figure 4 also displays the dollar book corresponding to equation (6). The variable $P_d$ is the dollar denominated loan portfolio. The variable $A_d$ represents some dollar denominated liquid assets held by the commercial banks as sight deposits in foreign institutions, or in their dollar accounts at the central bank. \(^4\)

Finally, equations (7) to (9) imply that the peso component of the capital is modified by random and independent shocks, and that banks will keep whatever long dollar position they may have in the form of liquid assets $A_d$.

\(^4\)See Reynoso ([17]) for a description of the dollar reserve requirements that Banco de Mexico imposes on local commercial banks.
\[ K_p = m_p + s_p \xi \]  
\[ K_d = \overline{K_d} \]  
\[ A_d = \overline{A} \]

with \( \xi_j \sim N(0,1) \), for all \( j \), and \( \text{cov}(\xi_i, \xi_j) = 0 \) for \( i \neq j \). Again, \((i,j)\) are indices for labeling the independent observations. We will also assume that \( \text{cov}(\xi_i, z_j) = 0 \) for all \( i \) and \( j \).

**The Public.** The setting is one of risk neutral individuals who make portfolio allocation decisions on a given wealth, \( W \) (constant in peso terms), as shown in equation (10). \( D_d \) stands for the amount of dollars that people hold outside the banking system and \( D_p \) for the deposits in pesos in the local banking sector.

\[ D_d^0 + D_d/e = W \]  

In deciding whether to hold pesos or dollars, these agents have to determine an expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, \( E(\gamma|R_{-1}^*|) \), and then compare it with a measure of their opportunity cost. \( R^* \) will be some measure of the international reserves as defined by equation (21), below.

To explain how we think that this process takes place, let's look first at the expectation formation mechanism, and then we will come back to the discussion on what the relevant opportunity cost should be.

The starting point is the calculation of the expected value of the two sides of equation (1). Equations (11) to (14) do so by using the fact that shocks to reserves are normally, independently and identically distributed. They also highlight some characteristics of the model that are worth looking at in some detail:

\[ f(\rho|R_{-1}^*) = \frac{\rho}{W \kappa s \sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(\frac{-(\rho - R_{-1}^*)^2}{2\kappa^2 s^2}\right) \]  
\[ h(\rho|R_{-1}^*) = \frac{e_{\text{target}}}{\kappa s \sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(\frac{-(\rho - R_{-1}^*)^2}{2\kappa^2 s^2}\right) \]  
\[ E(e|R_{-1}^*) = \int_{-\infty}^{W e_{\text{target}}} f(\rho|R_{-1}^*) d\rho + \int_{W e_{\text{target}}}^{\infty} h(\rho|R_{-1}^*) d\rho \]  
\[ E(\gamma|R_{-1}^*) = \frac{((E(e|R_{-1}^*) - e_{\text{target}})/e_{\text{target}})}{} \]
The model is constructed having in mind a solution where people hold peso deposits as default. Later on we will explain how the parameters of the model can be set to have the situation where the economy is dollarized.

The variable $R^{*}$, or *adjusted reserves*, is the level of reserves that people think that the central bank will hold once the foreign banks have made their decision on how much they will lend to domestic banks. It follows from equations (2) and (4), that the level of reserves could go down if banks see their foreign funding stopped. We will develop an expression for $R^{*}$ further down.

We introduce the parameter $\kappa$ here, and in the opportunity cost section of the model. Its purpose is to capture the possibility *hysteresis* or *irreversibility* of capital flight. The situation in mind is that since individuals do not have the possibility to establish dollar denominated deposits at home, they can either buy dollars and place them ‘under the mattress’, or take them abroad. In practice, the latter is often an irreversible phenomenon with some clandestine overtones, often for tax reasons. Namely, if individuals decide to bring back their flown capital, they are supposed to declare and pay taxes on the accrued and realized interest and exchange gains. Frequently this is a substantial transaction cost which only makes possible the repatriation either, when there is
the perspective of a large exchange rate appreciation and/or when the government declares a tax amnesty.

We decided to model this problem as one of a *mandatory stay*, that is, if the public takes money out of the domestic system, they would have to keep such *dollars* abroad for $\sqrt{\kappa}$ periods. For that reason, the relevant exchange rate forecast is not the one step-ahead, but the $\kappa$ step ahead projection. Finally, since we have assumed a stationary, normal and separable shock process for the supply of dollars adjustment on the conditional expectation formula amounts to simply scaling up $\kappa$ times the standard deviation $s$.

Figure (3) is the Simulink representation of what was said above. It is important to mention that the block named "S-Function: adjusted expectations" calls back the MATLAB subroutine in the appendix B which replicates equations (11) to (14).

Once individuals have made the calculations of the return in *dollars of holding pesos* implicit in equation (14), we assume that they compare it with the interest rate on *peso* denominated assets.

$$D_p = \begin{cases} W & \text{if } [(1 + i)^\kappa + E(\gamma|R_{-1}^*) - 1] \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (15)$$

Figure 4: Simulink representation of the subsystem for the general public.
Foreign lenders  Foreign banks play the role of funding the dollar lending portfolio of local banks. The basic assumption is that foreign banks will lend as long as they think that local banks are solvent. Lets define $K^*$ in equation (17) as the level of capital below which the foreign banks consider that they would not be able to collect their principal and interest. We can also define the default probability $\Pi$ in equation (19) which will depend on the dollar value of the total capital ($e K_p$ and $K_d$) of the local banks.

\[
\hat{e} \equiv E(e|R^{*}_s) \tag{16}
\]

\[
K^*(\hat{e}, K_d) = (1 + i^f) \frac{L^f_d}{\hat{e}} - \frac{K^*_d}{\hat{e}} \tag{17}
\]

\[
p(\lambda, K_p) = \frac{1}{s_p \sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{(\lambda - K_p)^2}{2s_p^2}\right) \tag{18}
\]

\[
\Pi(\hat{e}, K_d, K_p) = \int_{-\infty}^{K^*(\hat{e})} p(\lambda) d\lambda \tag{19}
\]

Finally, the decision of how much to lend is given by equation (20) where the foreign banks adjust their rate of return $i^f$, by the chances of not been paid $\Pi$, either because the capital dries up for reasons like bad loans, or because its value drops significantly due to a devaluation.

\[
L^f_d = \begin{cases} P_d & \text{if } i^f - \Pi(\hat{e}, K_d, K_p) \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{20}
\]

Equation (20) also allows us to write down the following definition for $R^*$:

\[
R^* = R^{*}_s - Pd + L^f_d \tag{21}
\]

Figure (5) is the Simulink representation equations (16) to (21). The block named "S-Function: default_probability" calls back the MATLAB subroutine in the appendix C which replicates the subset of equations (16) to (19).

Putting the subsystems together  The Simulink implementation of the complete model is done by simply interconnecting the subsystems in figures from 1 to 5. This is shown in figure 6, where each one of the subsystems is masked.
Figure 5: SIMULINK representation of the subsystem for the foreign banks

The parameter_editor block lists all the exogenous variables, but one. The remaining one is the domestic interest rate $i$, which will be set in the way described in section 1.2. Finally, the rectangular output blocks correspond to the endogenous variables whose performance will be followed to rank the various institutional arrangements in section 2.

1.2 Parameterizing the degree of currency substitution

Is there any difference between dollarization and no-dollarization? Instead of splitting the scenarios by means of comparing regime with a fixed versus a flexible exchange rate; we have decided to look at the dichotomy between a dollarized economy, and another one where people hold peso deposits $D_p > 0$, both with the same target exchange rate.

Our model implies that, inside some interval, interest rates could move to exactly compensate the expected rate of depreciation, conditional on the current exchange rate being equal to some target value $e_{\text{target}}$. In practice, this exchange rate could be thought as a level consistent with some inflation objectives. In the absence of interventions in the forex market, it is perfectly possible to see a rather stable exchange rate accompanied by relatively volatile interest rates.\footnote{This seems to have been the case for the Mexican Economy since 1995}

As long as the authorities (and/or the economy as a whole) can sustain in-
Figure 6: SIMULINK representation of the model
terest rates at levels below some stress rate \( i^{\text{max}} \), given the level of reserves \( R \) and nominal wealth \( W \), everybody will have their wealth in pesos. However, given the specification of this model, the expected exchange rate is always below the \( e_{\text{target}} \) level. Therefore, if interest rates are low enough, everybody will run into dollars even if an actual devaluation is a rare phenomenon.

Let's see why this is true by looking at the domestic interest rate. In a regime where people keep their peso deposits, the authorities are supposed to have a feasible \( i^{\text{max}} \) consistent with a sustainable \( e_{\text{target}} \). Most of the time, however, the market rate will be lower, as shown by equation (22)

\[
(i + i^{\text{max}}) \geq (1 + i) \geq \sqrt[4]{1 - E(\gamma|R^{\text{nd}}_{-1})}
\]

where \( R^{\text{nd}}_{-1} \) stands for \( R^*_{-1} \) in the case of \emph{no dollarization}.

In the \emph{dollarized} economy that is, where \( D_p = 0 \) or \( D_d = eW \), the \( i^{\text{max}} \) rate can be set to arbitrarily low levels. The observed interest rates will now be defined by equation (23).

\[
(1 + i) \geq \sqrt[4]{1 - E(\gamma|R^{d}_{-1})}
\]

Since \( D_d \) does not enter in the definition of \( R^* \) in equation (21), it has to be the case that \( R^d = R^{\text{nd}} \), which means that the interest rate in both cases can take the same values.

**How \( i^{\text{max}} \) is determined** The simulations in section 2 will be done for the \emph{no dollarization} case. This will allow us to gather some additional information on the implications of the alternative \( i^{\text{max}} \) distinguish two the c In the other case, it will be endogenously determined by the \emph{Value at risk (VAR)} criterion in equation (24)

\[
Pr(\sqrt[4]{1 - E(\gamma|R^*_{-1})} \geq i^{\text{max}}) \leq \alpha
\]

### 1.3 Parameterizing the regulatory regime

Based on the Mexican experience as described in table 1, we will simulate five regulatory cases.
Case 1. Segmented banking activities but not general capital controls. This will be the situation where:

- Commercial banks are not allowed to carry out any transaction in dollars. Therefore, they only have a peso book and the corresponding capital in pesos: $K_d = L_d^f = P_d = 0$.
- Individuals can freely convert their pesos into dollars and take them in and out of the country at no penalty: $\kappa = 1$.

Case 2. Segmented banking and general capital controls.

- Commercial banks are not allowed to carry out any transaction in dollars. Therefore, they only have the peso book and capital in pesos: $K_d = L_d^f = P_d = 0$.
- Individuals see their capital flight as an irreversible phenomenon for the reasons delineated in section 1.1. Thus, it is assumed that the individual agents can get their dollars and take them out of the country but, by doing so, they would be trespassing some administrative and/or tax rules: $\kappa > 1$.

Case 3. Banks can lend in dollars and borrow abroad but they have to have matched positions. There are not capital controls.

- Commercial banks can have a lending portfolio in dollars, $P_d > 0$, but face two restrictions. On the one hand, their liabilities in dollars have to be matched by assets in the same amount, $K_d = 0$; and they are not allowed to take dollar deposits to fund the dollar lending portfolio, $P_d = L_d^f$.
- Since we do not assume capital controls, $\kappa = 1$.

Case 4. Banks can have long positions in dollars. There are not capital controls.

- Commercial banks are not allowed to take deposits in dollars, but they can have long dollar positions. In other words, they are allowed (required) to have a dollar book with its own capital, additional to the general capital requirements. The assumption will be that
such long dollar component will be held in the form of liquid assets: 
\[ A = K_d = \overline{K}_d > 0. \]

- The dollar loan portfolio is funded with resources coming from overseas loans, \( P_d = L^f_d \).
- In this case \( \kappa = 1 \), since no general capital controls are assumed.

**Case 5. Full integration: local banks are branches of foreign banks**

Because we are assuming a small economy, replacing the local banks with branches of large foreign banks, is equivalent to assuming arbitrarily large values for \( K_d/P_d \). In this sense, case 5 is a limiting example of case 4.

Furthermore, given the structure of the model in section 1, the simulation outcomes for variables such as the exchange rate, the domestic interest rates and the country risk premium must be the same as those in case 1. The reason is that by having the foreign parent banks to take care of the funding of the dollar denominated operations, the central bank is insulated from any contingency deriving from the sudden erosion of the commercial banks capital or from abrupt funding stoppages.

Of course there will be variables that will behave differently in cases 1 and 5, such as the loan portfolio in dollars and the dynamics of the net position of the commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank.

Therefore, since case 5 would be redundant with others, it is not explicitly simulated in section 2. Notwithstanding, the reader should be able to see the implications of this construct through the inspection of the simulation results for cases 1 and 4.

## 2 Simulations

### 2.1 Simulation parameters

Since the simulations are carried out assuming no dollarization, \( i^{\text{max}} \) is obtained endogenously.

The model of figure 1 is simulated 50 times for different values of \( i^{\text{max}} \), starting from those given in table 2 in column \( i_0^{\text{max}} \). In each simulation round values of \( i^{\text{max}} \) are increased in steps of 0.05 until one is able to obtain a sample where the exchange rate is equal to the target \( e_{\text{target}} \) in all but two
observations; that is, 96% of the time. This corresponds to a value for the parameter $\alpha = 0.04$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$m$</th>
<th>$s^2$</th>
<th>$e_{\text{target}}$</th>
<th>$W$</th>
<th>$\kappa$</th>
<th>$P_d$</th>
<th>$i_f^1$</th>
<th>$m_p$</th>
<th>$s_p^2$</th>
<th>$K_d$</th>
<th>$i_q^{\text{max}}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Simulation Parameters

The parameters of 2 imply an economy where the level of available reserves is larger than $e_{\text{target}} W$ but smaller than $e_{\text{target}} W + P_d$. This implies that for a devaluation to actually take place it would be necessary to have both, the foreign banks and the public running against the central bank, and values of $i^{\text{max}}$ beyond what is sustainable.

The scenarios of table 2 aim at capturing three aspects of the problem:

- The impact per se of various regulatory constructs.
- The performance of such regulatory settings under different degrees of volatility in the balance of payment shocks. To that end, the variable $s$ is let to go from 1 to 3.
- The extent to which the response of the economy to external shocks varies when the banking sector is more or less capitalized. To see that, we are assuming a banking sector whose capital runs from $\frac{110}{10}$ to $\frac{12}{10}$ of the economy. The dollar portfolio, for the cases where it is non-zero, amounts to 30% of the peso liabilities of the banking system, whereas the volatility of capital in the banking sector is set to 0.3 in all scenarios.

Finally, as for the MATLAB and Simulink simulation parameters, the solver options are set to fixed-step for the ODE5 Dormand Price algorithm.
2.2 How the output is organized

The tables in the appendices summarize the outcome of 1,200 simulations, resulting from 50 simulations per round times (4 regulatory scenarios + 4 additional scenarios for different values of $K_d$ and $m_p$), times 3 scenarios corresponding to different values of $s$. The tables in the appendix A and report the mean and variances of each round of 500 simulations.

2.3 The results

- Generalized capital controls (Case 2) and a requirement of large long dollar positions imposed on banks (case 4.c), display the best performance with respect to $i^{max}$, the level of expected exchange rate $\hat{e}$ and the volatility of the expected exchange rate, $\bar{\text{var}}(\hat{e})$ for all values of $s$ (Tables 3, 4 and 5).

- When the volatility of the balance of payments shocks is low; $s = 1$, cases 1 (market segmentation without controls); 2 (generalized controls); 3.c (banks well capitalized in pesos) and 4.c (banks well capitalized in dollars) do equally well. However, when such volatility increases, the most effective shield is given by capital controls, if we look at $i^{max}$ as benchmark. If we also look for high values of $\hat{e}$ and low numbers for $\bar{\text{var}}(\hat{e})$, case 4.c remains a very strong option.

- With respect to $\hat{e}$, tables 4 and 5 show that case 3.c under-performs cases 1, 2 and 4.c when the volatility of the balance of payments, $s$, increases. The reader shall read tables 4 and 5 knowing that the expected exchange rate for case 2 reflects the $\kappa$-step ahead forecast. Therefore, when the adjustment is made to make it comparable to the rest of the scenarios, case 2 fares very well.

- If banks are moderately capitalized (cases 3.b and 4.b), they do as bad as when they are poorly capitalized (cases 3.a. and 3.b). This suggests that there may be a discontinuity that, unless properly addressed, makes the scenario of financial repression superior to the more deregulated ones.

- The numbers in table 6 correspond to what would be the lower bound for the domestic interest rate, $i_{min}$, once the sign is changed. The results once again confirm what the lowest rates are achieved in cases where
segmentation is more extreme or where the liberalization of banking transactions is accompanied by their adequate capitalization.

- Table 12 suggest that foreign banks may be make a more sharp distinction across well capitalized banks depending on whether they are capitalized in pesos or dollars, due to differences in probability, \( \Pi \). For low values of \( s \), scenarios 3.c and 4.c do not display significant differences. However, this is not longer the result for larger values of \( s \).

- Cases 3.a to 3.c may have an impact on our definition of Base Money. When banks capitalize in pesos in our money, and they deposit them in the central bank, they are actually performing the role of picking up liquidity from the markets, which has a contractionary bias. This contrasts with what happens when banks capitalize in dollars, because such dollars go to the reserves achieving the corresponding sterilization effect. There are obviously ways in which the central bank could compensate the impacts of the former case, however it will end up having a net debtor position with the commercial banks, which has proven to have, in practice, consequences in the way monetary policy is carried out. ⁶

**Conclusions**

The banking sector plays a very important role in the transmission mechanism of shocks that affect the exchange rate and interest rates in a small open economy.

When banks are weak, their own specific shocks are added to the balance of payments shocks, unless there is some degree of negative correlation between them. This means that financial liberalization, when banks lack enough capital to cushion their own risk, may add to the vulnerability of the economy as a whole.

This paper shows that the segmentation of the foreign exchange market may be a good policy response when, either the banks or the central bank do not have enough resources to withstand unforeseen shocks. However, it also suggests that if such resources are available, there is no reason to keep such market segmented.

Further understanding of this topic will benefit from the analysis of the recent evidence on the relationship between exchange controls and bank solvency and macroeconomic performance of small economies, specially in times of significant uncertainty.

References


A Simulation results for the no-dollarization scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( s = 1 )</th>
<th>( s = 2 )</th>
<th>( s = 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
<td>0.2500</td>
<td>0.4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
<td>0.2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>0.4000</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>0.6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>0.3500</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>0.6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.3000</td>
<td>0.6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>0.3500</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>0.6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.3500</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>0.6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.2500</td>
<td>0.4000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Stress interest rate levels: \( i^{max} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( s = 1 )</th>
<th>( s = 2 )</th>
<th>( s = 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9812</td>
<td>0.9345</td>
<td>0.8836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9537</td>
<td>0.8713</td>
<td>0.7860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>0.8017</td>
<td>0.7708</td>
<td>0.7265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>0.8630</td>
<td>0.8066</td>
<td>0.7533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>0.9812</td>
<td>0.9303</td>
<td>0.8573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>0.8017</td>
<td>0.7708</td>
<td>0.7265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.9373</td>
<td>0.8904</td>
<td>0.8372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.9783</td>
<td>0.9322</td>
<td>0.8815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Expected exchange rate: \( \hat{e} = E(e|R_{-1}') \)
### Table 5: Variance of the simulated expected exchange rate: \( \text{var}(\hat{e}) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( s = 1 )</th>
<th>( s = 2 )</th>
<th>( s = 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
<td>0.0198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>0.0194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>0.0322</td>
<td>0.0538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0082</td>
<td>0.0260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.0162</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
<td>0.0529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0074</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6: Expected rate of depreciation \( \hat{r} = E(\gamma | R^*_{-1}) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( s = 1 )</th>
<th>( s = 2 )</th>
<th>( s = 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.0188</td>
<td>-0.0655</td>
<td>-0.1164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.0463</td>
<td>-0.1287</td>
<td>-0.2140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>-0.1983</td>
<td>-0.2292</td>
<td>-0.2735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>-0.1370</td>
<td>-0.1934</td>
<td>-0.2467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>-0.0188</td>
<td>-0.0697</td>
<td>-0.1427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>-0.1983</td>
<td>-0.2292</td>
<td>-0.2735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>-0.0627</td>
<td>-0.1096</td>
<td>-0.1628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>-0.0217</td>
<td>-0.0678</td>
<td>-0.1185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7: Sample variance of the rate of depreciation: \( \text{var}(\hat{r}) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( s = 1 )</th>
<th>( s = 2 )</th>
<th>( s = 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
<td>0.0198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>0.0194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>0.0322</td>
<td>0.0538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0082</td>
<td>0.0260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.0162</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
<td>0.0529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0074</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.9943</td>
<td>10.5804</td>
<td>10.5746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.9943</td>
<td>10.5804</td>
<td>10.5746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>7.5861</td>
<td>7.5804</td>
<td>7.5746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>8.7494</td>
<td>8.4987</td>
<td>8.3093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>10.5861</td>
<td>10.4579</td>
<td>10.0236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>8.5861</td>
<td>8.5804</td>
<td>8.5746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>13.0351</td>
<td>13.0293</td>
<td>12.9624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Average Level of International Reserves: $R + A_d$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9269</td>
<td>8.8380</td>
<td>14.0394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9269</td>
<td>8.8380</td>
<td>14.0394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>5.4904</td>
<td>8.8380</td>
<td>14.0394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>9.6071</td>
<td>13.9016</td>
<td>19.0676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>5.4904</td>
<td>11.9358</td>
<td>17.7170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>5.4904</td>
<td>8.8380</td>
<td>14.0394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>10.4401</td>
<td>15.3190</td>
<td>21.9727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>7.3275</td>
<td>8.8380</td>
<td>14.0394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Sample variance of International Reserves: $\bar{\text{var}}(R + A_d)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0843</td>
<td>0.7737</td>
<td>1.1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0843</td>
<td>0.7737</td>
<td>1.1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>1.5862</td>
<td>2.0471</td>
<td>3.8085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>-1.2665</td>
<td>-0.3876</td>
<td>1.5350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>-3.5224</td>
<td>-3.6126</td>
<td>-2.8233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>1.1205</td>
<td>1.6553</td>
<td>2.4358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.4776</td>
<td>0.7169</td>
<td>0.9622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.0307</td>
<td>-0.0609</td>
<td>-0.1940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Monetary Base: $R + L_d + L_p$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2832</td>
<td>4.2755</td>
<td>5.4551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2832</td>
<td>4.2755</td>
<td>5.4551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>1.7622</td>
<td>3.0671</td>
<td>55.8468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>3.1110</td>
<td>4.2958</td>
<td>57.6424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>3.5792</td>
<td>1.4518</td>
<td>3.7653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>1.5355</td>
<td>1.3602</td>
<td>4.7967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>3.5792</td>
<td>4.4839</td>
<td>6.2421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.4908</td>
<td>3.1061</td>
<td>10.1478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Variance of the sample Base: $\text{var}(R + L_d + L_p)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>0.4117</td>
<td>0.4903</td>
<td>0.5403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0415</td>
<td>0.1309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.0619</td>
<td>0.0878</td>
<td>0.1167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Probability of default: $\Pi$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b</td>
<td>0.1641</td>
<td>0.1856</td>
<td>0.1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.c</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0359</td>
<td>0.0955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.b</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
<td>0.0317</td>
<td>0.0590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.c</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Sample variance of the probability of default: $\text{var}(\Pi)$
B Code for the S-Function block: adjusted expectations

function [sys,x0,str,ts] =adjusted_expectations(t,x,u,flag)
switch flag,
    case 0
        [sys,x0,str,ts] =mdlInitializeSizes;
    case 3
        sys=mdlOutputs(t,x,u);
    case { 1, 2, 4, 9 }
        sys=[];
    otherwise
        error(['Unhandled flag = ',num2str(flag)]);
end
function [sys,x0,str,ts] = mdlInitializeSizes()
    sizes = simsizes;
    sizes.NumContStates = 0;
    sizes.NumDiscStates = 0;
    sizes.NumOutputs = 2;
    sizes.NumInputs = 6;
    sizes.DirFeedthrough = 1;
    sizes.NumSampleTimes = 1;
    sys = simsizes(sizes);
    str = [];
    x0 = [];
    ts = [-1 0];
function sys = mdlOutputs(t,x,u)
    syms r W
    f=(r/u(3)).*(1/(u(6).*u(4).*sqrt(2.*pi))).*
    *exp((-1/(2.*(u(6).*u(4)).^2)).*(r-u(1)).^ 2);
    W=u(3);
    g=int(f,-Inf,W);
    k=eval(g);
    h=u(5)*(1/(u(6).*u(4).*sqrt(2.*pi))).*
    *exp((-1/(2.*(u(6).*u(4)).^2)).*(r-u(1)).^ 2);
    m=int(h,W,Inf);
    n=eval(m);
p=n+k;
q=((p-u(5))/u(5));
sys = [p, q];
C Code for the S-Function block: adjusted expectations

```matlab
function [sys,x0,str,ts] = default_probability(t,x,u,flag)
case 0
 ;[sys,x0,str,ts]=mdlInitializeSizes;
case 3
 sys=mdlOutputs(t,x,u);
case { 1, 2, 4, 9 }
sys=[];
otherwise
 error(['Unhandled flag = ',num2str(flag)]);
end
function [sys,x0,str,ts] = mdlInitializeSizes()
sizes = simsizes;
sizes.NumContStates = 0;
sizes.NumDiscStates = 0;
sizes.NumOutputs = 1;
sizes.NumInputs = 3;
sizes.DirFeedthrough = 1;
sizes.NumSampleTimes = 1;
sys = simsizes(sizes);
str = [];
x0 = [];
  ts = [-1 0];
function sys = mdlOutputs(t,x,u)
syms c f=(1/(u(2).*sqrt(2.*pi))).*exp((-1/(2.*u(2).^ 2)).*(c-u(1)).^ 2);
g=int(f,-Inf,u(3));
k=eval(g);
sys =k;
```