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CLASS #22: MONETARY POLICY AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT/INFLATION TRADE OFF
There is always a temporary tradeoff between inflation and unemployment; there is no
permanent tradeoff. The temporary tradeoff comes not from inflation per se, but from
unanticipated inflation, which generally means, from a rising rate of inflation.
Milton Friedman
- The empirical trade off between inflation and unemployment: the
Phillips curve.
- The Phillips curve across different monetary policy regimes: the
expectation augmented Phillips curve.
- Can monetary policy exploit this trade off?
The Phillips Curve: an empirical regularity
- Phillips 1958 article, using UK data: negative relationship between
unemployment and changes in nominal wages.
- US during the 1960's: negative relationship between unemployment and
inflation.
- US after 1970: the relationship disappears. Why?
- Monetary policy in the Classical Model: the Misperception theory
(Lucas' islands model)
- Say the government doubles the money supply (and people are
not aware of it).
- There is more money in the economy. At the ongoing nominal
prices, demand rises.
- If people knew about the doubling of the money supply, they
would simply double the price at which they sell their products.
- However, since they do not know, each producer may think that
the observed increase in the demand for their own product is due to a
change in tastes in favor of her own product, and decide to work more and
increase supply:
- The government (the central bank) cannot fool people
all the time. If it tries to, people will interpret all increases in demand
as due increases in the money supply, and will not change their behavior.
- Is the Phillips Curve exploitable for policy purposes?
The Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve
from the misperception theory:
Let us add and subtract
from the right hand side:
and let us remember Okun's Law:
We obtain a ``theoretical version" of the Phillips curve:
where
.
- The negative relationship is there, for given inflationary
expectations.
- Suppose the Central Bank tries to exploit this relationship by
increasing the growth rate of money supply, and thereby increasing inflation:
the public is at first fooled, but then changes inflationary expectations.
The Phillips curve shifts upward.
The surprise is over.
- US after 1970: inflationary expectations change and the Phillips curve
shifts; in the late 80's it shifts back.
- Like in the Classical misperception theory: in the long run the trade
off is no longer there.
Policy Games
- Can the Central Bank exploit the Phillips curve to achieve lower
unemployment?
- What is the fight for the head of the European Central Bank all about?
- Why do the media talk of ``conservative" Central Bankers, of
reputation of central bankers, etc.?
- Independent central bakers.
Let us assume that the Central Bank can control inflation (all it can
control, in fact, is money supply).
Let us say that for political/economic reasons the Central Bank wants to
minimize both unemployment and inflation, that is, its objective function
is:
Of course, the Central Bank takes into account that there is something
called Phillips curve out there, so that it cannot minimize both. The
constraint is therefore:
After substituting the constraint in the objective function, the problem
for the Central Bank becomes:
with respect to
.
The private sector is contracting their wages, debt contracts... they
want to predict inflation as good as they can, otherwise it is going to
be bad news for somebody (for workers if inflation is above expectations,
for entrepreneurs is inflation is below expectations).
Say that the Central Bank could commit to an inflation rate
,
announce it today, and have the public believe it.
Since the public is forming expectations on the basis of the Central Bank's
announcement, it is clear that
.
So nobody is fooled,
and the Central Bank cannot ``run the Phillips curve".
Of course, the best thing to do for the Central Bank is to set
,
so at least it has zero inflation, even if it has no gain on the
unemployment side.
Let us consider the more realistic case where the Central Bank cannot
commit itself. Once the private sector has formed the inflationary
expectations
,
the Central Bank takes them as given as chooses
so to maximize its objective function.
The first order condition is:
Which deliver the solution:
However, the private sector knows how the Central Bank is going to behave.
So it sets
at a level
such that
:
What is the result?
- Since
,
from the Phillips curve one can see that the
Central bank has made no progress in reducing unemployment:
.
- However, inflation is higher than zero:
- Why do we obtain such a perverse result?
- Time inconsistency
If the Central Bank could commit itself in advance, it would chose zero
inflation all the time. But it cannot commit, and once the private sector
has chosen expected inflation the incentive to cheat is too strong. The
private sector knows it, and it takes preventive action by setting
inflationary expectations so high that it is not convenient for the
government to cheat.
- Note that the higher
,
the lower inflation: if the Central
Banker dislikes inflation a lot, the private sector does not in turn have
to set expectations so high.
- Also, the lower
,
the lower inflation: if the Phillips
curve is vertical the Central Bank cannot cheat anyway. But the flatter it
is, the greater the incentive to cheat, the greater the ``punishment" in
terms of high inflation.
- Conservative Central Bankers are high
Central Bankers:
people who dislike inflation a lot (for political or intellectual reasons).
- Repeated games: reputation.
The public perceives that a Central Banker who has never cheated will not
cheat.
- Independent central bakers.
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Marco Del Negro
2000-04-24